No. 97-1553.United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.Heard September 9, 1997.
Decided October 3, 1997.
Marie Cheung-Truslow with whom Roger A. Emanuelson and Lecomte, Emanuelson, Motejunas Doyle were on brief for appellant.
Michael J. Eisele with whom David C. Boch and Bingham, Dana
Gould were on brief for appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts [Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge], [Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge].
Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge, and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
ALDRICH, Senior Circuit Judge.
[1] On January 20, 1995, an oil fire broke out in the boiler room of the Kimball TowersPage 137
condominium in Springfield, Massachusetts, that caused extensive damage from smoke, soot and heat. Kimball Towers Condominium Association (Kimball) was insured by Preferred Mutual Insurance Company (Preferred) under a Business Owners Special Property Policy that covered its property broadly, with a limit of $11,340,000 and an annual premium of $40,484. With some exceptions, the policy did not cover steam or hot water boilers and their equipment. Kimball was also insured by Travelers Company (Travelers) under a Boiler and Machinery Policy. Boiler provisions complementary with Preferred’s have been noted. Travelers’ policy had no dollar limitation; the annual “Provisional Premium”[1] was $875. Preferred paid this loss,[2] in the amount of $357,279, and now sues Travelers for this amount as the “primary insurer,” or, at least, for a share. A condition precedent is that Travelers would have been liable for the loss. The district court held that there was no such coverage, so that neither alternative was correct, and granted summary judgment to Travelers in an extensive opinion. See Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Cos., 955 F. Supp. 9
(D. Mass. 1997). Without deciding, it assumed that Travelers’ policy’s general provisions covered the loss — an assumption not contested, and that we adopt — but concluded that it fell within the stated exclusions. On this basis we affirm.
. . . . .
[11] 2. Covered Cause of Loss
. . . . .
[13] G. DEFINITIONS
. . . . .
[15] 5. “Object” means:
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for direct damage to Kimball’s property due to the breakdown of the boiler and its accessory equipment. We consider the burner, the burner tube, the mechanical fuel pump, and the electric motor that operates it, to be accessory equipment. Leaking was a breakdown, or “accident.”
[19] B. EXCLUSIONS [20] We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.. . . . .
[21] 4. Other Exclusions
. . . . .
[25] The initial paragraph unambiguously means what it says. If the fire fell within the provisions of section B4a it is not covered even though it also met some other definitions. Cf. Jussim v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 415 Mass. 24, 27-28, 610 N.E.2d 954, 955-56 (1993) (noting that if the proximate cause “is an insured risk, there will be coverage even though the final form of the property damage, produced by a series of related events, appears to take the loss outside the terms of the policy”). Preferred says the present issue lies in provision 4a’s second sentence because the loss was caused by the breakdown of the fuel pump that was “electrical equipment” because it was operated by an electric motor. Although there was some struggling vocalizing by Preferred’s expert, we can not possibly agree. We do not rely on the much mentioned fact that the pump and the motor were by different manufacturers, but they were independent articles, connected only by the power shaft, with no electricity reaching the pump. Manifestly there must be some purpose for the alternative clause in provision 4a, and, equally manifestly, electricity must play a meaningful part. To characterize the pump as electrical is nonsense.
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