No. 94-1080.United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.Heard May 4, 1994.
Decided July 27, 1994.
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Leonard M. Singer, with whom Heidlage Reece, P.C., Boston, MA, was on brief, for appellants.
Michael J. Engelberg, with whom Ronald M. Jacobs and Nutter, McClennen Fish, Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
Before BREYER,[*] Chief Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and CYR, Circuit Judge.
CYR, Circuit Judge.
[1] Resolution Trust Company (RTC or appellee), as receiver for ComFed Savings Bank (ComFed), brought the present action on July 13, 1993, to recover monies allegedly due from defendants-appellants Harold M. Gold and Graphics Leasing Corporation (collectively, “Gold”) under their joint guaranty of loans ComFed made to First Equity Funding Corporation. Gold did not answer until RTC filed its motion for entry of default. The late answer admitted the guaranty, contesting only the amountclaimed by RTC. It asserted no affirmative defenses. [2] On September 20, RTC moved for summary judgment. After failing to file timely opposition, see D.Mass.Loc.R. 7.1(B)(2), Gold requested more time for discovery, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f), and, on October 22, sought leave to amend its answer to interpose four affirmative defenses, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). The district court thereafter entered summary judgment for RTC and summarily denied Gold’s belated request for leave to amend its answer, without ruling on the request
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for additional discovery, and Gold appealed. We affirm.
I [3] DISCUSSION[4] Leave to Amend
[5] We review denials of leave to amend under Rule 15 for abuse of discretion, deferring to the district court for any adequate reason apparent from the record. Demars v. General Dynamics Corp., 779 F.2d 95, 99 (1st Cir. 1985); Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 429 F.2d 849, 851 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1193, 28 L.Ed.2d 324 (1971). Leave to amend is to be “freely given,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), unless it would be futile, Northeast Fed. Credit Union v. Neves, 837 F.2d 531, 536 (1st Cir. 1988), or reward, inter alia, undue or intended delay, see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). As the Rule 15 motion in the present case was not filed until after RTC moved for summary judgment, Gold was required to demonstrate to the district court that the proposed amendments were supported by “substantial and convincing evidence.” Torres-Matos v. St. Lawrence Garment Co., Inc., 901 F.2d 1144, 1146 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). There was no such showing.
(1st Cir. 1991) (citations omitted) (applying Mass. law). Indeed, the Stitt affidavit does not constitute competent evidence as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). See Lopez v. Corporacion Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1515-16 (1st Cir. 1991) (Rule 56(e) requires that affidavits filed in opposition to summary judgment be based on competent evidence). [8] As its “Second Affirmative Defense,” the proposed amended answer simply alleged that “The Complaint is barred by the doctrine of estoppel.” Gold presented neither explication nor argumentation in support of the estoppel claim in the district court. McCoy v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22
(1st Cir. 1991) (“theories not raised squarely in the district court cannot be surfaced for the first time on appeal.”), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1939, 118 L.Ed.2d 545 (1992). Nor does Gold discuss the estoppel claim on appeal. Thus, even if the estoppel claim had been pleaded and preserved below, it would be deemed to have been waived on appeal. See, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank v. Howard Communications Corp., 980 F.2d 823, 828 n. 8 (1st Cir. 1992). [9] The third affirmative defense, predicated on Gold’s alleged entitlement to a one-year grace period to cure the default, fails due to the absence of competent evidence of an enforceable waiver and the fact that the default was never cured. See supra p. 253. [10] Finally, the proposed amended answer asserts — based exclusively on “information and belief” — that ComFed failed to require the borrower to submit appraisals substantiating the 75% loan-to-collateral-value ratio required under the note, which allegedly placed Gold at undue risk under its unconditional loan guaranty. Not only does Gold point to no evidentiary basis for its “information
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and belief,” it fails even to intimate that such evidence exists. Moreover, Gold’s attempt at delaying the inevitable adverse judgment would have failed for lack of competent evidence even if interposed in a timely manner. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991) (where nonmovant has ultimate burden of proof on matter at issue, summary judgment motion must be met by “definite, competent evidence”), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). Similarly, Gold’s perfunctory assertion falls far short of the “convincing evidence” required to establish a “substantial” defense. See Torres-Matos, 901 F.2d at 1146. Lastly, this “defense” is precluded by the express terms of the loan guaranty: “[Gold] hereby waives any other act or omission of the Bank (except acts or omissions in bad faith) which changes the scope of [Gold’s] risk.” Gold has not alleged bad faith.
[11] In sum, the motion for leave to amend, proffered at the eleventh hour to fend off summary judgment, proposed four patently futile affirmative defenses fully meriting summary rejection. Jackson v. Salon, 614 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1980) see also Neves, 837 F.2d at 536 (“Federal courts need not tiptoe through empty formalities to reach foreordained results.”). [12] Summary Judgment[13] Gold failed to oppose RTC’s motion for summary judgment within the fourteen-day period prescribed by local rule. See
D.Mass.Loc.R. 7.1(B)(2). Of course, the failure to file timely opposition did not necessarily entitle RTC to summary judgment Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1517; Mendez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 900 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment was proper only if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Gold, revealed no trialworthy issue of material fact and RTC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Velez-Gomez v. SMA Life Assur. Co., 8 F.3d 873, 875 (1st Cir. 1993); Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1517. On the other hand, Gold’s untimely submissions need not have been considered by the district court in determining the appropriateness of summary judgment. See Mendez, 900 F.2d at 7-8 (citing cases). [14] RTC proffered competent evidence that Gold was liable in the amount claimed under its loan guaranty. Moreover, an examination of all of Gold’s submissions — timely as well as untimely — has not disclosed a trialworthy issue of material fact relating either to the amount of the indebtedness or to any affirmative defense belatedly asserted in the district court. There is no basis for vacating summary judgment in these circumstances.[1] [15] “Just Damages” Under Rule 38
[16] Finally, RTC requests an award of “just damages,” including attorney fees and double costs, pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 38. Even though Gold failed to interpose opposition to an award of just damages, we have discussed its frivolous appellate claims at undeserved length in order to demonstrate their dilatory aim and amenability to sanction. Moreover, Gold has offered no other plausible explanation, let alone a justification, for its dilatory litigation tactics below or on appeal. Accordingly, a reasonable attorney fee award and double costs shall be imposed against Gold for this frivolous, dilatory appeal.
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See Cowdell v. Cambridge Mut. Ins. Co., 808 F.2d 160, 163
(1st Cir. 1986) (pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 38, awarding double costs and attorney fee as just damages for frivolous appeal).